[Majorityrights News] Trump will ‘arm Ukraine to the teeth’ if Putin won’t negotiate ceasefire Posted by Guessedworker on Tuesday, 12 November 2024 16:20.
[Majorityrights News] Alex Navalny, born 4th June, 1976; died at Yamalo-Nenets penitentiary 16th February, 2024 Posted by Guessedworker on Friday, 16 February 2024 23:43.
[Majorityrights Central] A couple of exchanges on the nature and meaning of Christianity’s origin Posted by Guessedworker on Tuesday, 25 July 2023 22:19.
[Majorityrights News] Is the Ukrainian counter-offensive for Bakhmut the counter-offensive for Ukraine? Posted by Guessedworker on Thursday, 18 May 2023 18:55.
LONDON, ENGLAND: Anti-Brexit campaigner Steve Bray protesting outside of the Houses of Parliament on January 30, 2020 in London, United Kingdom. At 11.00pm on Friday 31st January the UK and Northern Ireland will exit the European Union 188 weeks after the referendum on June 23rd 2016.
In 2016, Britain voted for Brexit. On Friday—four years, three prime ministers and two general elections later—the country will leave the European Union. Officially stepping out into the world is a major moment for a country that has driven itself mad on the tortuous path to the exit door. And yet, even the buildup to this historic event typified the silliest aspects of the years between the “leave” vote and the actual leaving.
Two quarrels about how Britain would mark the occasion broke out in recent weeks, one about a bell, the other about a coin. First came the fuss about whether Big Ben would ring out to mark the moment of independence. This Brexiteer wish was complicated by the fact that the bell, and the tower that houses it, are undergoing renovations, meaning a single bong would come with a $700,000 price tag. After Parliament refused to fund the move, and an online fundraising campaign failed to fill the gap, there will be no Big Ben bongs. “If Big Ben doesn’t bong, the world will see us as a joke,” lamented Brexit campaigner Nigel Farage.
A second brouhaha broke out over a commemorative 50 pence coin issued to mark the occasion. The coins, which read, “Peace, prosperity and friendship with all nations,” soon drew the ire of disbelieving Remainers. Otherwise serious and self-respecting members of the British establishment said they would refuse to use the coins or would deface any that came into their possession. (The novelist Philip Pullman also complained that the coin “is missing an Oxford comma and should be boycotted by all literate people.”)
Britain’s talent for turning these trivial rows into front-page stories illustrates how much the Brexit debate has become a negative-sum culture war, with Leavers and Remainers each compelled to take a side. Yet these dust-ups also obscure some of the more interesting, and important, divides over what Britain does with its newfound freedom. So far, much of the conversation has been backward looking, focused on whether the country would give effect to the 2016 vote with a viable version of Brexit, or whether that vote should be ignored. As Britain leaves the EU, and finally casts an eye forward, there are as many disputes as ever, with global implications, and the fault lines are more complicated than just Leave vs. Remain.
When Prime Minister Boris Johnson triumphed in last month’s election with a promise to “get Brexit done,” his opponents argued that after the sun rises on February 1, Britain’s future relationship with the EU, and a host of related questions, would remain unresolved. In a narrow sense, that claim is irrefutable. But it also misses the bigger picture.
The case for Brexit was built on possibilities. Among other things, exiting the EU allows Britain to decide for itself what trade relationships it should pursue with the rest of the world, the criteria it should set for its immigration system and how to regulate a host of areas that have been the competence of the EU for decades. These are big, difficult decisions in and of themselves. They aren’t part of a Brexit process that will ever be finished. Britain will not one day declare mission accomplished and no longer give any thought to, for example, trade policy—something that, as Americans will know, is an ongoing consideration in the politics of sovereign countries.
Understand that fact, and the divide between Leave and Remain starts to look less significant. On trade, for example, there is a split among Leavers. An image of buccaneering “Global Britain” striking trade deals with fast-growing economies around the world was a big part of the case pro-Brexit politicians made. There is little enthusiasm for this vision among Leave voters. According to one poll, Leave voters were more likely to support protectionist trade policies than Remainers. In fact, whether someone voted Leave was the single best predictor of a person’s support for barriers to trade. Politicians eager to use Brexit as an opportunity for liberalizing UK trade will have to think carefully about which voters they can rely on.
Posted by DanielS on Monday, 27 January 2020 10:47.
Christopher Caldwell: America’s two constitutions — since the ‘60s, competing visions of a more perfect union
Christopher Caldwell, author of the book ‘The Age of Entitlement,’ says Democrats and Republicans have two different conceptions of what the country is about. Fox News, 27 Jan 2020:
Not long after he left the White House, Bill Clinton gave what is still the best description of the fault lines that run through American politics. “If you look back on the ’60s and on balance you think there was more good than harm, you’re probably a Democrat,” he said. “If you think there was more harm than good, you’re probably a Republican.”
What could he have meant by that?
Though Americans are reluctant to admit it, the legacy of the 1960s that most divides the country has its roots in the civil rights legislation passed in the immediate aftermath of John F. Kennedy’s assassination. It was enacted in a rush of grief, anger and overconfidence — the same overconfidence that had driven Kennedy to propose landing a man on the moon and would drive Lyndon Johnson to wage war on Vietnam. Shored up and extended by various court rulings and executive orders, the legislation became the core of the most effective campaign of social transformation in American history.
This campaign was effective both for its typically American idealism and for its typically American ruthlessness. It authorized Washington to shape state elections, withhold school funds, scrutinize the hiring practices of private businesses and sue them. It placed Offices of Civil Rights in the major cabinet agencies, and these offices were soon issuing legally binding guidelines, quotas and targets. Above all, it exposed every corner of American social, business and political life to direction from judges.
Americans assumed that solving the unique and extraordinary problem of segregation would require handing Washington powers never before granted in peacetime. In this they were correct.
But they were also confident that the use of these powers would be limited in time (to a few years at most), in place (to the South), and in purpose (to eliminating segregation). In this they misjudged, with fateful consequence for the country’s political system.
Civil rights law may have started off as a purpose-built tool to thwart the insidious legalism of Southern segregation and the violence of Southern sheriffs. It would end up a wide-ranging reinvention of government.
After the work of the civil rights movement in ending segregation was done, the civil rights model of executive orders, regulation-writing and court-ordered redress remained.
This was the so-called “rights revolution”: an entire new system of constantly churning political reform, bringing tremendous gains to certain Americans and — something that is mentioned less often — losses to many who had not necessarily been the beneficiaries of the injustices that civil rights was meant to correct.
The United States had not only acquired two codes of rules (two constitutions), as people rallied to one code or the other, they also sorted themselves into two sets of citizens (two countries). To each side, the other’s constitution might as well have been written in invisible ink.
Civil rights became an all-purpose constitutional shortcut for progressive judges and administrators. Over time it brought social changes in its wake that the leaders of the civil-rights movement had not envisioned and voters had not sanctioned: affirmative action, speech codes on college campuses, a set of bureaucratic procedures that made immigrants almost impossible to deport, gay marriage, transgender bathrooms.
In retrospect, the changes begun in the 1960s, with civil rights at their core, were not just a major new element in the Constitution. They were a rival constitution, with which the pre-1964 one would frequently prove incompatible — and the incompatibility would worsen as the civil-rights regime was built out.
Our present political impasse is the legacy of that clash of systems. Much of what we today call polarization” or “incivility” is something more grave. It is the disagreement over which of the two constitutions shall prevail: the pre-1964 constitution, with all the traditional forms of jurisprudential legitimacy and centuries of American culture behind it; or the de facto constitution of 1964, which lacks this traditional kind of legitimacy but commands the near-unanimous endorsement of judicial elites and civic educators, and the passionate allegiance of those who received it as a liberation.
As long as the baby boom generation was in its working years, permitting the country to run large debts, Washington could afford to pay for two social orders at the same time. Conservatives could console themselves that they, too, were on the winning side of the revolution. They just stood against its “excesses.” A good civil rights movement led by the martyred Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. had been hijacked, starting in the 1970s, by a radical version that brought affirmative action and eventually political correctness.
But affirmative action and political correctness were not temporary. Over time they hardened into pillars of the second constitution, shoring it up where it was impotent or illogical, the way the invention of judicial review in Marbury v Madison (1803) shored up the first constitution.
Both affirmative action and political correctness were derived from the basic enforcement powers of civil rights law. And this was the only civil rights on offer. If you didn’t like affirmative action and political correctness, you didn’t like civil rights. By 2013, when Americans began arguing over whether a cake maker could be forced to confect a pro–gay marriage cake, this was clear.
The United States had not only acquired two codes of rules (two constitutions) —as people rallied to one code or the other — they also sorted themselves into two sets of citizens (two countries). To each side, the other’s constitution might as well have been written in invisible ink. Democrats were the party of rights, Republicans of bills. Democrats say, by 84 to 12 percent, that racism is a bigger problem than political correctness. Republicans, by 80 to 17 percent, think political correctness is a bigger problem than racism. The Tea Party uprising of 2009 and 2010, and its political mirror image, the Black Lives Matter uprising of 2015 and 2016, were symbols of that division.
Much happened this century to bring matters to the present boil. Barack Obama, both for his fans and his detractors, was the first president to understand civil rights law in the way described here: as a de facto constitution by which the de jure constitution could be overridden or bypassed. His second inaugural address, an explicitly Constitution-focused argument, invoked “Seneca Falls and Selma and Stonewall” — i.e., women’s rights, civil rights and gay rights — as constitutional milestones.
In this view, the old republic built on battlefield victories had been overthrown by a new one built on rights marches and Supreme Court jurisprudence. When Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote his decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, the 2015 gay marriage case that was in many ways the culmination of this new rights-based constitution, he said as much.
The election of 2016 brought the change into focus. Today two nations look at each other in mutual incomprehension across an impeachment hearing room. It appears we are facing a constitutional problem of the profoundest kind.
Posted by DanielS on Monday, 27 January 2020 06:27.
Washington Post journalist is suspended after tweeting a link to a 2016 story about Kobe Bryant’s rape case just hours after he died in helicopter crash.
Felicia Sonmez is a national political reporter for The Washington Post
She was suspended by the newspaper on Sunday after controversial tweet
Sonmez was roasted for a post hours after Kobe Bryant died in helicopter crash
She tweeted link to 2016 story about the 2003 rape allegations against Bryant
Twitter users blasted Sonmez for timing of the post, which she then deleted
Sonmez replied that 10,000 people sent her ‘abuse and death threats’
In 2003, a 19-year-old woman alleged that Bryant raped her in Colorado hotel
The charges were dropped and the two sides settled a civil lawsuit
A Washington Post journalist has been suspended by the newspaper after she tweeted a link on Sunday to a years-old story about the Kobe Bryant rape case just hours after the basketball legend and his daughter were killed in a helicopter crash.
Felicia Sonmez, who covers national politics for the Post, took to Twitter shortly after the world learned of Bryant’s death along with eight others aboard his private helicopter which crashed outside of Los Angeles.
She posted a link to an April 2016 story from the news site The Daily Beast which carried the headline: ‘Kobe Bryant’s Disturbing Rape Case: The DNA Evidence, the Accuser’s Story, and the Half-Confession.’
The tweet generated hundreds of shares and thousands of likes as well as many comments.
Sonmez says she has received death threats after posting the tweets.
In follow-up tweets, Sonmez wrote: ‘Well, THAT was eye-opening.
Felicia Sonmez, a national political reporter for The Washington Post, angered Kobe Bryant fans on social media on Sunday
Felicia Sonmez, a national political reporter for The Washington Post, angered Kobe Bryant fans on social media on Sunday
‘To the 10,000 people (literally) who have commented and emailed me with abuse and death threats, please take a moment and read the story - which was written 3+ years ago, and not by me.
Two facts — just two — explain almost everything about Miami: In 1960, the city was 90 percent white; by 1990 it was only ten percent white. Virtually everything else about Miami today — crime, poverty, race riots, cultural decay, third-world squalor — follows from this astonishing change in population.
To be sure, it is important to understand the mix of people who displaced whites. Cubans, especially those who arrived first, have had a very different effect from that of Haitians or Nicaraguans. However, no city could show more clearly how dependent upon race and ethnicity are a city’s character and civility. No city could show more clearly that large-scale displacement of whites marks the end of everything commonly thought of as “American.”
Miami is one of the bellwethers for the nation that will result if the silent invasion from the third world continues. It is therefore important to know what has happened to the city and why.
First Came the Cubans
Cubans are now the dominant group in a city that is 63 percent Hispanic and 27 percent black. Even Dade County, which surrounds Miami, is about 50 percent Hispanic and 21 percent black, with whites making up no more than 29 percent of the population. Aside from a few quickly-shrinking enclaves of white influence, Cubans control business, politics and culture.
Related at Majorityrights
Hundreds of thousands of Cubans fled to Miami after Fidel Castro’s victory in late 1958, but they did not come simply because it was near by. Florida and Cuba have connections that are centuries old, and the post-Castro migration was only part of a long history.
From the earliest times, imperial Spain had ruled Florida and Cuba under a single administration. There was no political border between the two territories until Andrew Jackson conquered Florida, and the United States annexed it in 1821.
Even before the city of Miami was founded in 1896, the area had long played a part in the ructions of Cuba’s tropical politics. The South Florida coast was an important supply route for Cubans fighting Spanish colonial rule, and the smugglers and gun runners were largely unmolested by Americans intent on building a vacation resort.
The Spanish-American war brought American-imposed stability to Cuba, but once the country tried governing itself, it reverted to opera buffa politics. In his 1917 essay, Gore in the Caribbees, H.L. Mencken describes the “Latin exuberance” of a failed revolution. “It was an exhilarating show,” he concludes, “but full of strangeness for a Nordic.”
Revolutions routinely deposited refugees and counter-revolutionaries in Miami, and former exiles would sail back to Cuba with the next violent change in government. In 1933, for example, Gerardo Machado was overthrown and Miami teemed with his henchmen. In 1952, Fulgencio Batista staged a coup and his predecessor, Carlos Prio, packed his bags for Miami. In 1958, it was Batista’s turn to move north. All three are buried in Miami, where residents got used to itinerant dictators and their hangers-on.
The immediate effect of the Castro take-over was to reduce the number of Cubans living in Miami. Many had been scheming against Batista and streamed home in the wake of Mr. Castro’s victory. They streamed back to Miami when Mr. Castro began to build the workers’ paradise.
The real exodus from Cuba did not start until a year or two after the revolution, but when it came, Miami was the obvious destination. During the Prio and Batista years, even middle-class Cubans took annual vacations in Miami, and after airplane service began it was fashionable for rich Cubans to take one-day shopping trips to Florida. The Cuban upper classes escaped to a familiar and comfortable refuge.
At first, Miami’s whites ignored the post-Castro rush, confident that like all previous waves of political casualties, it would wash out again with the next coup. Moreover, the first crop of Cubans was the wealthy, well-educated white elite who spoke English and slipped easily into Miami society. However, by 1965, 210,000 Cubans had come to Miami, and by 1973 another 340,000 had boarded the twice-daily “freedom flights” for Florida. The quality of immigrants steadily declined, though few Cuban blacks and mulattoes had yet to come north.
During this period the Miami Herald still reflected the views of whites, and its editorials echoed rising alarm over the alien invasion. However, Cubans fleeing from communism made first-rate cold-war propaganda, and the federal government flouted the wishes of whites by welcoming the Cubans as refugees. It was Mr. Castro who finally stopped the “freedom flights” in 1973, but Miami’s transformation was well under way. The first wave of Cubans came to plot counter-revolution in the hope of going back home; later waves expected to stay.
Cubans quickly established a distinct community. They came not only with a common nationality, but with a fierce anti-communism that set them apart from the soft liberalism of America. They employed and did business with each other, continuing relations that had been established for years. Some businesses simply moved across the Florida Straits. The Caballero Funeral Home, for example, advertises that it was founded in 1858, at a time when Miami did not exist. It was founded in Havana.
Many entrepreneurs had scant regard for American legalities or customs, and they brought with them a corner-cutting, under-the-table mentality that still characterizes Miami. However, Cubans were scrupulous in their relations with each other because a violation of trust meant exclusion from the community.
The fact that well-off businessmen had come first made things much easier for the later arrivals. Cane-cutters just off the plane were grateful for any kind of work, and were both loyal workers and customers for Cuban businesses. At the same time, perpetually rocky politics in Latin America sent north a steady flow of flight capital. Naturally, it went to Miami, where nervous Argentines and Colombians could count on fellow Hispanics to invest their nest eggs in solid American banks.
What was the effect of the Cuban presence on the Miami labor market? One of the few “respectable” criticisms of non-white immigration is that it displaces blacks, and it is widely maintained that this happened in Miami. In fact, it was whites who were replaced. The garment industry, for example, was 94 percent white in 1960, but by 1980, it was 83 percent Hispanic. Black participation in the industry held steady at 5-7 percent.
KMG’s comments are helpful because he adds some clues about the relevant parties under discussion, which Kersey, being in the Jarod Taylor camp, would shy away from. We can then in turn, add the brackets.
Kathy Boudin gets mugged herself
KMG: I’ll introduce (((Chesa Boudin))). He is now the district attorney of San Francisco. Lets talk about his parents. His mother’s name is (((Kathy Boudin))); and she’s a convicted murderer. She was a member of The Weather Underground, formerly The Weathermen, which I suppose is the most notorious domestic terrorist group operating in the United States after the Second World War. She later became an adjunct professor at Columbia University. How about that? His father, (((David Gilbert))), is also a former member of The Weather Underground and a convicted murderer; and he’s still in prison.
So, this fellow, Chesa Boudin has now promised, according to Paul Kersey at V-Dare, to stop gang enhancements to stop criminals of color. It was the law in San Francisco that people who were arrested for serious crimes and had gang affiliations, that this meant a longer sentence for them, because the authorities were eager to bust gangs.
According to the San Francisco Chronicle, “one of Chesa Boudin’s first planned policy changes when he takes over as San Francisco’s District Attorney next month seeks to answer a question that has long ignited debates in this city:
Should people accused of crimes face harsher punishments if their actions allegedly benefited a street gang?”
Because Non-Whites Committing Violent Crime in California Frequently Are Gang Members, New San Francisco District Attorney Promises to Stop Gang Enhancements to Protect “Criminals of Color”
Previously on SBPDL:
San Francisco Chronicle Covers Up Black Violent Crime Epidemic in Six Percent Black City By… Blaming Whites for Low Clearance Rate in Black Homicides
“What I’m saying is that man had rights!”
Well I’m all broken up about that man’s rights.
— Dirty Harry
The new District Attorney of San Francisco has declared war on the criminal justice system. Why? All because the concept of law and order is, in his eyes, deemed to perpetuate “structural inequalities and white supremacy.”
A Union Jack flag flutters in front of Big Ben as workers inspect one of its clocks, in London on Sept 11. (Reuters photo)
Related at Majorityrights
Kathy Boudin gets mugged herself